As in Bosnia and Rwanda, the war is not being fought so much against the armed guerrillas of the EZLN, but rather the civilian population of the Zapatista 'base support communities'. The PRI regime's aim is to exterminate and expel the Zapatista communities, so depopulating huge areas of the oil, water and mineral-rich l.acandona Jungle, an area even more biodiverse than the Brazilian rain tbrests. In this way not only will 'the fish have no water to swim in', but the path towiirds the greater exploitation of the area's human and natural resources by mainly US-based transnational corporations (TNCs) will have been greatly smoothed, as was always the intention of the NAFTA free trade agreement.
The Acteal Massacre has been cynically used by the PRI regime to step up the repression and harassment of the indigenous Zapatista communities by both the army and PRI paramilitary groups who, despite some token arrests following the massacre, now enjoy ever greater impunity and support from the Mexican Federal Army and the Chiapas state police force. The Zapatista communities have fought back by accelerating their own implementation of the San Andres Accords, setting up some 32 'autonomous municipalities' under the terms of the agreement. The PRI regime is now attempting to bulldoze its revised and heavily diluted version of the accords through the Mexican Congress. Meanwhile, it has launched a campaign of violent repression against the main autonomous municipalities such as Taniperlas and San Juan de la Libertad, where on June 10, eight Zapatistas and two policemen were killed during an attack involving a J ,000-strong column of soldiers, police and paramilitary forces, supported by tanks, helicopters and artillery. Hundreds have been imprisoned or forced to flee into the mountains, leaving women, children and old people at the mercy of the Mexican army and the MIRA (Revolutionary AntiZapatista Indigenous Movement), a PRllinked paramilitary organisation which now rules Taniperias and other repressed communities by terror with the open cooperation of the security forces.
In order to intensify its repression of the insurgent Zapatista communities, the PRI regime has had to forcibly remove one of the main obstacles to this course of action, namely the presence of large numbers of foreign human rights observers many of whom stay in 'peace camps' inside Zapatista communities in order to provide some sort of protection from state terror. Over 200 such observers have been deported in the last year as the PR! regime has whipped up a crude xenophobic campaign in the press, blaming the Chiapas coiiJiict on meddling by foreign political activists and local Catholic Church priests of foreign origin. Some 40 Italian human rights observers were permanently expelled from Mexico in May, the most extreme deportation order, which before this year had only been used once in the last 15 years.
There can be little doubt that the PRI regime's use of state terror in Chiapas enjoys the tacit support of the US and EU governments, the latter of whom signed a free trade agreement with Mexico last December, despite its first clause making its implementation dependent on respect for human and democratic rights. Notwithstanding its 'ethical' foreign policy the New Labour presidency of the EU has failed to criticise President Zedillo's policy of state terror in Chiapas and the British press have ignored the issue. A possible explanation could be that Britain is the EU's second largest investor in Mexico and the fourth in the world. It has also emerged that the Labour government continues to grant export licences for the sale of weapons to the Mexican Army.'
The Zapatista struggle since 1994
The EZLN implemented the decision of the Zapatista Mayan indigenous communities of Chiapas to militarily oppose the introduction of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on January 1 1994. San Cristobal de Las Casas and four other major towns were briefly captured, townhalls ransacked and land ownership documents burnt during a JOday revolt which the Mexican army attempted to crush through the mass murder of prisoners and the aerial bombing ofvillages, leaving over 150 dead. However, the rapid national and international mobilisation carried out partially through the Internet, the first of many such 'cyber mobilisations', quickly isolated the corrupt and discredited regime of former President Salinas, forcing it into direct negotiations with the EZLN. Those liberated areas under the control of the EZLN instituted their own 'revolutionary laws' on a range of issues from women's rights to collective land use, in direct opposition to the PRI regime's neoliberal policies. Although they have been broken off on various occasions, particularly during President Zedillo's treacherous attempt to arrest the EZLN leadership during a meeting with the government in February 1995, negotiations eventually led to the signing of the San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture between the government and the representatives of not just the EZLN but all the 32 indigenous peoples of Mexico, including those close to the PRI regime itself. This was not a final peace agreement but the first of what would have been a series of five accords on different issues. These would eventually have led to the disbanding of the EZLN and its integration as a purely political organisation as part of the FZLN (Zapatista Front for National Liberation), set up partially for tliis purpose in January 1996. Under the auspices nf the peace process a remarkable and historically unique event also took place in early August 1996, the 'First Intercontinental Cathering for Humanity and against Neoliberalism', which saw some 4,000 grassroots political activists and supporters of the HZLN from the five continents gather in five Zapatista Communities in Chiapas to share the experiences of their different struggles against global neoliberalism. The resulting 'Second Declaration of La Realidad' helped to promote the organisation of a second gathering in Spain last year and the emergence of People's Global Action, an international network of local movements which is now campaigning against the plans of global neoliberal institutions such as the World Trade Organisation.
The EZLN suspended its participation In the peace talks, again on the orders of the indigenous Communities, in August 1996 when it became clear that the PRI regime was not taking a serious attitude towards negotiation but was simply buying time while paramilitary organisations were recruited, armed and trained under 'Plan 1994', a Mexican army document published in the political weekly Processo in January this year. The document specifically saw the role of peace talks as a masquerade behind which the state's repressive cutting edge, the 'plausibly deniable' paramilitary groups, would be organised and deployed. The EZLN then set five conditions for the peace talks to be restarted, the first being the immediate implementation of the San Andres Accords, as revised by the COCOPA (the all-party Congressional Committee For Concord and Pacification) in December 1996. The PRI regime has refused to do so as it would 'undermine national sovereignty' and lead to the 'balkanisation' of Mexico. The peace process has not been officially ended by the government but Its actions have effectively killed it off. This situation was acknowledged by Bishop Samuel Ruiz, the former chair of the independent CONAl (National Intermediary Commission), the main link in the previous dialogue between the EZLN and the government, when he resigned in June following a PRI smear campaign, so causing the CONAI to dissolve itself
The social and political composition of the Zapatistas January 1 1994 was chosen by the EZLN's base support communities as the starting date for armed rebellion as NAFTA, due to be implemented on that day, represented a lethal threat to their collective way of life, land use and indeed existence. Ex-President Salinas' reform of the Constitution's Article 27, protecting the ejidos (community-owned collective lands) from privatization, had already opened the floodgates to US agribusiness and Chiapas' large landowners who increased their use ofgiiardias blaricas (hired guns) to force indigenous communities off their lands. The removal of all trade barriers and forms of protection for these communities fi-om TNC predators in the name of 'joining the first world' was eftertively a death sentence. The situation of Mexico's 'forgotten' peoples had been worsening at an even greater rate than the rest of the population since the debt crisis of 1982, with levels of poverty, disease, infant mortality, and life expectancy worse in Chiapas than anywhere else in Mexico. Resistance and organisation by various autonomous campesino (farmer) and indigenous organisations had also been increasing throughout the 1980s. The EZLN slowly emerged over 13 years from the remnants of those organisations who refused to be bought oft or intimidated, a hybrid mixture including ex-Maoist guerrillas with roots in the 1968 students movement, such as the mestizo intellectual Subcomandante Marcos. But its foundations have been the indigenous traditional practices of the direct participatory democracy and the autonomy of the community assembly. One of the EZLN's main innovations has been the use of the language of storytelling and poetry rather than political dogma, as epitomised in Marcos' stories of Don Durito, Old Antonio and the rebellious child Heriberto. Some commentators have tried to present Marcos as the 'leader' of the EZLN rather than the t^CRI (the Rebellious Indigenous Clandestine Committee), while others see him more as a spokesperson, chosen by the communities to act as a cultural bridge between the indigenous world and that of the Mexican and international antagonist movements who have become its allies. While the EZLN is mainly composed of the indigenous Mayan peoples of the state of Chiapas, it is neither a separatist Chiapanecan movement nor exclusively indigenous in its composition or demands. It claims to exist throughout Mexico and to be made up of people from all the main ethnic groups in Mexico, both from urban and ninil areas.
Following the 1994 rebellion it was described by the Mexican intellectual Carlos Fuentes as a 'post-modern guerrilla movement... the first rebellion of the 21st century', because, in stark contrast with the rest of Latin America's 'focoist' tradition of armed struggle, it was not interested in the seizure of state power. Instead, the EZLN's strategy has been to build a series of alliances with what they term as 'organised national and international civil society' made up in Mexico of social movements, such as the inner city Assemblea de Barrios (Neighbourhood Assemblies), and El Barzon (The Yoke). The latter is a movement of small and medium scale farmers, business people and general debtors such as mortgage holders, whose struggle to reschedule or cancel their debts has helped to deepen the crisis of the Mexican banking sector. This sector is itself part of an overall tendency towards fragility among Latin American banking which some economists see as the Achilles tendon of the globalisation process. The EZLN's aim is to help to construct a network of such movements, both nationally and internationally, against the designs of NAFTA in Mexico and of globalised neoliberalism in general, so transforming society 'from the bottom upwards' and autonomously from the political and economic institutions of both the state and the market.
Such an approach necessarily eschews electoral politics, leading to a sometimes conflictual relationship with the main centre-left opposition party, the PRD (Party ofthe Democratic Revolution), as well as the Marxist-Leninist and Trotskyist organisations and some ofthe independent trade unions. Disagreeing with the Zapatistas rejection ofthe state as the site for the construction of a socialist society, and uneasy with the replacement ofthe mestizo industrial worker by the indigenous campesino as the central figure ofthe class struggle, some of these more 'historical' Left groups have formed a rival front, the FAC-MLN (Broad Front for the Construction of a National Liberation Movement). This is linked to the EPR (Popular Revolutionary Army) guerrilla movement operating in the states of Guerrero and Oaxaca since 1996, with which the EZLN has declined to develop relations due to the EPR's dubious origins^ and stated designs on state power. Overall, the Mexican Left, after initial enthusiasm for a revival in armed stru^e foUowing the 1994 rebellion, leading to widespread participation in the CND (National Democratic Convention) and later the MLN (National Liberation Movement), has been deeply divided more recently in its attitude towards the Zapatistas. This was reflected in the split in the MLN in 1995 which led to the separate formation ofthe FZLN and the FACMLN in 1996.
The EZLN takes its name and to some extent its ideology from the libertarian, anti-statist element ofthe 1910 1917 Mexican Revolution gathered around the peasant army led by Emiliano Zapata and the slogan 'Land and Freedom!'. It calls itself an army of'national liberation' as it sees Mexico (and not just Chiapas) as an occupied territory, conquered and piDaged first by European colonialism, then postcolonial 'latifundism' where economic policy was dominated first by the interests of land-owning and later industrial elites, and now by the interests ofthe TNCs, with their neoliberal project of free trade and free markets. The EZLN's use of the Mexican Hag. its 'social patriotism' and its break from the traditions of the revolutionary Left have led to accusations ot petit-bourgeois nationalism and social democratic reformism by the more dogmatic sections ofthe international radical Left. They have, however, failed to understand the EZLN's concept of nationhood based on a network of autonomous communities rather than the historically centralised, hierarchical nationstate. Nor do they appreciate the originality of its strategy for revolutionary transformation to a post capitalist society which is based not on a vanguardist seizure of the state and the commanding heights ofthe economy, let alone parliamentary reformism, but on an alliance with other grassroots social movements, including the Colonos, rural migrant squatters on the periphery of the main urban centres, the students, gay and women's movements, and the independent unions of teachers, electrical and transport workers. The H/,LN has refused to lead or hegemonize tliis gathering network of movements, but instead has sought to struggle side-by-side with them, consulting civil society at every stage in its negotiations with the government, also through self-organised referenda on a national scale to hear their opinions and suggestions for changes in its strategy. This strategy of grassroots autonomous networking is an extension and development ofthe indigenous practice of directly democratic decision-making through the search for consensus rather than the imposition of the 'majority' on the 'minority' through voting.
As part of this process the FZLN was formally constituted in September 1997, at the same time as the historical Caravan to Mexico City of 1,111 Zapatista delegates, one from each of the Zapatista communities in Chiapas. Popular support was remobilised and new alliances built with previously sceptical popular urban movements. The Zapatistas also demonstrated their growing autonomy from their allies among some sections of the Catholic ChLirch and tbe NGOs in Chiapas. At its founding congress the FZLN confirmed tbat it would not participate in elections nor could its members belong to political parties, leading to further problems with the PRD over 'double membership'. Interestingly, the EZLN declined to join the FZLN at tbis stage, preferring to keep its autonomy also from its civilian comrades.
A further criticism is that the direct participatorydemocracy of the indigenous communities' assemblies is a myth, with real decision-making power remaining in the hands of traditional elites of village elders, leaving youth and particularly women excluded. However, both youth and women, who make up a majority of the officers, are well represented within the ranks of the EZLN, which remains at the service of the communities as part of its adherence to the principle of niaridar ohediciendo (leading by following). The indigenous Zapatista communities bave made huge strides towards a real form of direct participatory democracy since 1994, but as with women's rights, this remains an ongoing process of consolidation v^thin those communities.
The demands of the Zapatistas
During the self-organised referendum campaign of August 1995 the EZLN put forward 13 demands as the basis for its struggle: land, work, food, health, housing. education, independence, democracy, justice, freedom, culture, access to information and peace. Four more demands were added during the course of tbe campaign: equal rights for women, security, an end to corruption and protection of tbe environment. However, the three main demands which it continually asserts in every public statement as a precondition to tbe others are democracy, freedom and justice.
By democracy, the Zapatistas also mean support for tbe immediate transition to parliamentary democracy, with local and national elections free from fraud and intimidation, signifying the end of the PRI's 70-year one-party-state, even if they do not intend at tbe moment to participate in electoral politics. But above all they mean the application at all levels of society of the direct participatory democracy of the local assembly, involving collective and inclusive decision-making based on consensus rather than voting. For the Zapatistas, freedom means autonomy and self-determination and in the context of Chiapas, indigenous autonomy and self-determination within the confines of tbe Mexican national territory. This desire and need for autonomy implies the right to self-organise society according to the needs, customs and practices of the immediate local community, ralber than submit to a form of government formerly imposed by the centralised nation-state and now by the global interests of neoliberal capital. Justice is synonymous witb dignity and respect for indigenous cultures and ways of life, indeed for all 'differences' within Mexico, linking up with the demands of the women's and gay movements. It also means an end to the impunity of the PRI regime, the punishment of its appalling human rights abuses and the endemic corruption of its 'narco-poUtical' alliance with business. military and organised crime elites. Ultimately, justice for the EZLN means social and economic justice in a postcapitalist society.
Economic background to the confiict in Chiapas
In Chiapas an increasingly bitter conflict is being fought between the EZLN with its 'support bases' among the indigenous and mestizo campesinos, and the PRI regime with its land owners and local caciques (tribal leaders), whose power bas now mutated into the form of paramilitary death squad activity. Beneatb this confiict lies the clash between two directly counterposed projects: tbat of Mexican and international neoliberal capital and tbat of indigenous autonomy. Neoliberalism is keen to intensify its exploitation of Chiapas' strategic reserves of natural, mineral and human resources. Chiapas contains one of the world's largest untapped oil fields. With tbe prospect of the privatization of PEMEX, the nationalised oil industry, the oil TNCs are already jockeying for position. Chiapas also provides 55% of Mexico's electricity from hydroelectric schemes, but 30% of homes and 90% of indigenous households in the state are without electricity. Chiapas bas 30% of Mexico's total water resources but only 10% of indigenous households have running water. The Lacandona Jungle, the Zapatista heartland, is the world's most biodiverse area and pharmaceutical companies such as the UK's Glaxo Wellcome group are positioned to exploit it as the competition between pharmaceutical companies accelerates over biogenetic products. Chiapas is also a major agricultural producer of coffee, corn and cattle. Despite this wealth in natural resources, 87% of indigenous school children in 1997 suffered from second degree malnutrition, with symptoms including stunted growth, as well as 100% of indigenous women over the age of 10 (Roviral997,p.220).
The local population has considerable land use, animal husbandry and other environmental skills which 'ecological' capitalism is interested in exploiting. Although neoliberalism's plans necessarily involve the wholesale depopulation and enclosing of the area, a small minority of those with such skills will still be needed to help exploit its natural resources. International Paper, the world's largest paper producer, has plans to buy up huge swathes of the Mexican south-east and develop eucalyptus plantations, whicb will devastate the soil and environment within a few years, leaving it completely exhausted, as well as necessitating the large scale removal of the local population and their dumping in urban shanty towns. According to the daily newspaper. La Jornada. International Paper's lobbyist within the Mexican government is a close advisor of President Zedillo, playing a key role in his decision to renege on the San AndriJs Accords. Chiapas is also close to the highly strategic Isthmus of Tehuantepec, due to become the new 'Panama Canal' after the 1999 handback, witb Japanese and Saudi Arabian money already invested in developing high speed rail and motorway links between two major port developments. Together with oil-ricb Tabasco and Oaxaca, Chiapas will form one of the four main 'corridors of development' planned by Clinton and Zedillo's technocrats to slash across Mexico on a north-east/southwest axis, so forming areas of intensely populated and deregulated urban sprawl where the maquiladora factory and the second cheapest labour supply in tbe world will form the productive base, as a more efficient outlet to the Pacific Rim markets for the north-east seaboard industries of the USA than the West Coast.
Against this macro-project of neoliberal expansion and human and environmental devastation, is tbe project of autonomy of the indigenous peoples of Chiapas and the rest of Mexico. The need for autonomy from NAETA was tbe driving force behind the January 1994 rebellion which in turn eventually lead to the signing of the San Andres Accords in February 1996.
The San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture
The importance of the Accords lies almost as much in the consultative and participatory process of their negotiation and formulation as in their contents. Some 500 representatives of Mexico's 32 indigenous peoples and from 178 indigenous organisations were invited by the EZLN and PRI government negotiators to a National Indigenous Forum in San Cristobal de Las Casas in January 1996. Regional indigenous forums took place throughout the country simultaneously. The EZLN adopted the demands of these forums as their own, leading to the signing of the accords with the govemment a month later. The Accords call for 'a new relationship between Tbe State and the indigenous peoples', including the recognition of indigenous rights and autonomy as defined in Convention 169 of the International Labour Organisation. Tbe Accords necessitate the remunicipalisation of indigenous regions, the free determination of the indigenous peoples, tbe promotion and protection of indigenous cultures and customs, the promotion of bilingual and cuIturaUy aware education, the creation of autonomous indigenous mass media, including radio and TV stations, and the rights of indigenous women to hold positions of authority and to have equality with men at all levels of government. Most crucially, they demand the direct control and use of the natural resources on and beneath indigenous lands. Tbis demand represents a direct threat to neoliberal designs to expropriate and exploit the natural and human resources of these areas for the interests of the TNCs and international investors, a far more radical form of autonomy than that which already exists in some states such as Oaxaca, which would break up and possibly render impossible tbe realisation of the planned 'corridors of development'. As such the Accords represent a revolutionary precedent which other non-indigenous groups and movements migbt well be inspired to take up in tbe struggle for their own kinds of autonomy.
Women's struggles against NAFTA Ironically, while the feminist movement is relatively weak in contemporary Mexico, women's participation in both urban and rural social movements against neoliberaiism has never been higher, as they struggle to end their Invisible, isolated status within Mexican society, a situation even more exacerbated for indigenous women, who have become the very symbols of popular resistance to NAFTA and the PRI regime. Following the implementation of NAETA in January 1994, many small and medium scale businesses closed, unable to compete witb US and Canadian TNCs, resulting in a massive growth in unemployment. Many women were forced into the sex industries and other branches of the 'informal' economy in order for them and their children to survive, where there are no workers rights or social welfare such as maternity leave and where insecurity is total. Furthermore, the level of illiteracy among indigenous women is 86% and malnutrition and homelessness are rife (Rovira 1997: 220) . The response of poor, working class and indigenous women to this direct attack on their living conditions has been to join or form tbeir own movements and co-operatives of exmaquiladora workers where often women are in the majority. Two of the main examples where women are fighting back against neoliberalism can be found in the Assemblea de Barrios and the CUT, two of the main urban social movements. The former emerged as a result of government inaction and corruption following the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City which left at least 10,000 dead and millions homeless, a date which in many ways marked the resurgence of the popular movements after the repression of tbe 1970s. The CUT (United Community of Tepotzlan), a popular movement wbicb took control in 1995 of a small town near Mexico City to stop developers building a golf course on sacred ground and depriving the community of its water resources, has seen women participate in an experience of the self-management of a community which has resisted armed police incursions for three years.
However, the most important example of women's participation in an antagonist movement are tbe Zapatistas of the BZLN and FZLN, who represent the constitution of a new way of doing politics, starting from the feelings and practices of women: 'The awakening to fight against the present and the past which threatens them (women) as a probable future' (Comandante Ramona). An International Women's Day march in San Cristobal in 1996 was the first ever by indigenous women. The Women's Revolutionary Laws, drawn up by the women of all the Zapatista communities in Chiapas, guarantee women the right to marry whoever they wanted to or not at all (a major break with both indigenous and rural traditions), to speak publicly in assemblies, to study and to own land. Despite patriarchal resistance within their communities, indigenous women have become the protagonists of the Zapatista movement, involved in squatting land, occupying PRl-controlled town halls, motorway blockades and marches for peace. They have been particularly active this year in leading the resistance to the attacks on Zapatista communities by the Mexican Army since the Acteal massacre, driving out soldiers with their bare hands. Some have been killed or wounded in confrontations with the security forces who regularly use gunfire against demonstrations. While men are forced to flee into the mountains when their communities are attacked, women bave insisted on staying to maintain their cooperatives and keep their communities alive, resisting the army and paramilitary groups' rule of terror, as is happening in Taniperlas and other autonomous municipalities which the PRI regime is attempting to dismantle. Ultimately, indigenous women's protagonism in the Zapatista rebellion has led them to examine their lives and decide which customs are worth keeping and which rights need to be recuperated. They have demanded that public meetings and assembles be no longer held in Spanish which effectively excluded them from participating in community decisionmaking as only men tend to speak it. For the same reasons they have also demanded that the Women's Revolutionary Laws be translated into indigenous languages.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding its arrogant impunity and cynical provocations, the PRI regime remains divided and in crisis, a liability i.md embarrassment to its 'ethical' neoliberal masters, its increasing violence a sign that it has lost control of the political mechanisms of consent whicb it once so skillfully manipulated, Its strategy of state terror has also begun to backfire. Some of the 'dismantled' autonomous municipalities have refounded themselves, despite the thousands killed, wounded, imprisoned or driven into starvation in the mountains or a reign of terror in the refugee camps. President Zedillo is again coming under increasing internal and external pressure, with a significant demonstration in Mexico City on June 18 demanding demilitarisation, tbe release of the Zapatista prisoners and the implementation of the San Andres Accords. An international campaign has been started to ensure that for every foreign observer deported 10 will take their place (with a free trip home guaranteed). Even the US Secretary of State, Madelaine Albright, has had to publicly lie tbat US arms will not be used for internal repression in Mexico. The Mexican economy remains in crisis following the Peso Crash of 1994, unemployment and poverty continue to grow and the Zedillo presidency is rapidly becoming the most hated in recent history, with the presidential elections in 2000 looming and victory for Cuahtemoc Cardenas, the likely PRD candidate, increasingly possible. But what v^ probably determine whether or not the Zapatistas outlive the PRI regime is tbeir relation of interdependence witb a significant section of international civil society, those who needed the inspiration of the Zapatistas' struggle and ideas to emerge from 20 years of defeat and begin to construct new forms of globalised political collective action. Now they must once again remobilise globally to put maximum pressure on the PRI regime and its US and EU backers, not out of 'solidarity' with the EZLN but as an integral part of their own struggle for autonomy fi^om neoliberalism.
